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**The Role of Brazil in South America:
The Need of Reliable Armed Forces to
Sustain the Development.**

***To my wife who gives meaning to my existence.
To my family who brings happiness to my life.
To my parents who never abandon my soul.***

ABSTRACT

This essay sets the stage in Brazil, the biggest country in South America. The work summarizes the historical background of Brazil in South America, showing the birth of the nation and its armed forces. It describes the greatness of the country in terms of geopolitical power, using Rudolf Kjellen's 'hand with five fingers.'

The work analyses the evolution of the military influence on governance with the objective to position the reader on the actual status of the armed forces contribution to Brazilian governance. It discusses the evolution Brazilian foreign policy as a benchmark to evaluate the Brazilian influence in South America, illustrating the actual role of the nation in world matters and examining the desires and future trends of Brazilian leadership.

Finally it outlines a risk assessment of Brazil considering South American environment and the role of the military, demonstrating that the armed forces have a fundamental role in sustaining development.

THE ROLE OF BRAZIL IN SOUTH AMERICA: THE NEED OF RELIABLE ARMED FORCES TO SUSTAIN DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

South America is the continent 'separated from Antarctica by the Drake Passage and ... joined to North America by the Isthmus of Panama.'¹ Brazil is the only Portuguese-speaking country in South America, but it is also the nation with the highest geopolitical indexes. Throughout recent decades, Brazil began a development process which has been characterized by the economy pushing social reforms. Again, the 'sleeping giant' is awakening.² This time things are different, however, considering the nation's position in South America. This study will assess Brazil's role in South America, examining the extent to which Brazilian leadership is a reality and contrasting the country's position with the influence suffered by other non Portuguese-speaking countries of the region. Going further, the study will outline the expected future participation of Brazil in South American matters, as an emerging power and a global player.

The first chapter will summarize the historical background of Brazil in the South American Context, starting with the discovery and advancing through the colonization, Empire and Republic periods, to explain the birth of the Brazilian nation and the position taken by the armed forces within it. It will contrast between the birth of Brazil and of the United States of America and use it as a way to understand the different paths trailed by these two huge countries during the 20th century.

The work will assess the national power using Rudolf Kjellen's geopolitical principles, identifying where Brazil is strong and pinpointing its weaknesses. The study will consider development according to the same five branches propped by Kjellen. It will use the most recent data available, after screening for reliable sources and limiting these to highly regarded universities, government institutions and supra-national organizations. This second chapter will demonstrate that the country is still developing.

The study will purposely leave military power aside, a key part of national power, to dedicate the two following chapters to this factor. For the purposes of the argument presented, by "armed forces" all three services should be understood: the Brazilian Navy, the Brazilian Army and the Brazilian Air Force. The third chapter will describe the development of the military ethos, starting with the independence process, when the sense of responsibility for the nation emerged. It will highlight the military government period initiated in 1964, not only because of its development

¹ South America. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555844/South-America> (accessed May 17, 2009).

² Peter Kingstone, "Brazil: The Sleeping Giant Awakens?" *World Politics Review*, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3145> (accessed May 17, 2009).

achievements, but fundamentally due to the total subordination process triggered by the military themselves. The fourth chapter focuses the role of the military throughout almost 25 years of civilian subordination, and it will end by evaluating the damage caused to the Brazilian armed forces by the transition efforts. Furthermore, it will assess the Brazilian National Defense Strategy (BNDS), looking at it as the awakening of the political level to its military component.

The fifth chapter of the study will consider the nation's relationship with other South American countries, after describing Brazilian power and its military component. It will analyse the Brazilian foreign policy, as a way to evaluate the extent to which Brazil exerts leadership in the region. It will also discuss the desire of successive administrations to achieve a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It will contrast the non-interventionist constitutional caveat of Brazil to roles implied by the position of leadership Brazil wants to occupy in the international scenario.

The sixth and last chapter will outline the threats Brazil may come to face in this century, contrasting them to related vulnerabilities, as a way to perform an assessment of risks. Based on this assessment, the analysis will summarize the role of Brazilian armed forces. Considering the ongoing development process, it will also examine the extent to which they may be contributing to the nation's development.

The conclusion will point out that the military power has a specific defense role in the development process – as do other parts of the national power. The present context requires reliable armed forces which may be capable of reaching the politically-driven end state, using resources allocated to them and avoiding an undesired level of side consequences. Moreover, other security issues exist, despite not being as traditional as war, where armed forces may act side by side with other government institutions, and thus contributing to development of the nation. This contribution, in some cases due to the natural friction of part of Brazilian territory related to resources disposition, goes further, transforming itself into sustainment.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BRAZIL IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTEXT

A fundamental question to help us to begin to understand Brazil is *why* it was discovered. At the time, Portugal stood as an Empire with a 'tendency to look beyond its borders'³; it was economically involved with the Islamic Mediterranean, and Genoa had invested in the Portuguese expansion effort, which resulted in Lisbon becoming a centre of great interest for its commerce. Moreover, due to the technology then available, Portuguese and Southwestern Spanish ports were favored by oceanic currents. The development of the *caravelle*⁴ proved to be a milestone for the Great Navigations, although expeditions could be sponsored by no less than someone with the dimension of the crown itself, considering huge costs involved. Politically, in a court surrounded by 'different influential sectors of...society – the nobility, the merchants, and the nascent bureaucracy'⁵ – expansionism would offer merchants promises of wealth, while at the same time representing new sources of income for the King, 'at a time when crown revenues had greatly diminished'⁶ due to the crisis in West Europe, keeping nobles busy. The expansion of Christianity satisfied the Church, and expeditions were always a chance to change common peoples' lives. The crown transformed 'overseas expansion...[into] a sort of great national venture...which went on for centuries.'⁷ And in Spain the situation was no different.

Another question that must be answered to establish the political bedrock to South American evolution has to do with *how* expansionism took place. Portugal and Spain were in fact competing on an expansionism race and there are still unanswered questions about who had

³ Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.

⁴ Light and rapid vessel with a shallow draft, which allowed it to come quite close to dry land and still avoid running aground. *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 2.

⁶ *ibid.*, 3.

⁷ *ibid.*

priority discovering the new continent. Spaniards claim that Columbus 'probably had touched the northern coast of Brazil on his third voyage in 1498 [and]...Vicente Yáñez Pinzón and Diego de Lepe...in 1500 had navigated along the northern coast too.'⁸ The Treaty of Tordesillas was signed in 1494, to resolve conflicts over newly-discovered lands, constraining Portugal to the east of the 320-mile west meridian off Cape Verde Islands. Spain would stay west of the same line.⁹ This treaty is a key point to understand the foreign policy outcomes generated by expanding Brazilian borders during the colonial period, when demarcation efforts faced strong Spanish colonization movements in surrounding lands. Spanish-speaking countries formed after independence processes in South America posed continuous opposition to the sole Portuguese-speaking country and this aversion is still sensitive in Brazilian foreign policy.¹⁰

Behind England and France in the Industrial Revolution, Portugal adopted an exploitation model in its colonies. Focused on this model, the Portuguese crown was concerned with organizing life in the colony,¹¹ fostering sugar cane *plantation*¹² system development, gold and diamond mining and supporting the cattle push into the backlands, overtaking the 320-mile line. A sense of societal unity was first revealed during 17th Century Dutch invasions, when 'Brazilians'¹³ expelled invaders without any help from the Portuguese Crown. It is difficult to determine limits between interests of the Portuguese crown and of Brazilians in 'flag' expeditions.¹⁴ Blurred boundaries between subordination and a sense of nationality led to the expansion of Brazilian borders to the West and to the South, penetrating the Amazon forest, expanding throughout seasonally flooded plains in central South America and crossing the fertile green prairies that today belong to Uruguay.¹⁵ Such violations of the treaty were facilitated by the Iberian Union (with the King of Spain also being King of Portugal) in effect from 1580 to 1640, when the 'presence of Spanish Bourbons on the Portuguese throne'¹⁶ came to a halt. New borders were later ratified by the 1740 Treaty of Madrid, observing the principle of *uti possidetis*¹⁷ to the advantage of the Portuguese.¹⁸

Brazil tells us of a unique case in history:¹⁹ in 1808, fleeing the Napoleonic threat, the Portuguese royal family and the entire court moved to the colony overseas. As a result, incredible

⁸ E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 27.

⁹ Treaty of Tordesillas. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/599856/Treaty-of-Tordesillas> (accessed April 11, 2009).

¹⁰ Mário Flores et al, "The Insertion of Brazil in the Regional and World Security," Centre of Political-Strategic Studies (Naval War College, 2006), 12.

¹¹ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 33.

¹² System of great extensions of land producing one kind of crop.

¹³ Brazil was still a colony, so the word 'Brazilian' may be argued as being incorrect. It describes the people whose lives were attached to the Brazilian land, with the emerging sense of nation.

¹⁴ Expeditions to capture and enslave Indians, to discover precious metal and stone mines and to find new areas for agriculture and cattle raising.

¹⁵ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 47-54.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷ Principle granting land ownership to its occupants. Treaty of Madrid. *Multirio*. Government of the State of Rio de Janeiro, http://www.multirio.rj.gov.br/historia/modulo01/tratado_madri.html (accessed April 11, 2009).

¹⁸ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 75.

development arose in Brazil, with an expanding public sector, infrastructure, industry, trade – caused by the opening of Brazilian ports to foreign commerce²⁰ - and culture. Here, ‘foreign commerce’ specifically refers to Britain, a country avid of new markets in a period of full industrial revolution bloom.

The Crown itself, which still favored Portuguese interests in Brazil, and a sense of inequality felt in the northeastern region were the main causes for a series of revolutions bursting throughout the colony. Although Portugal fought and defeated revolutionaries, the mark of a Brazilian nation was then forever carved in the Brazilian population. When the British finally defeated Napoleon, Dom João VI, the absolutist king of Portugal, was forced by Portuguese dominant classes to return to Europe. But after having hosted the court, Brazil could no longer be a colony: the independence process was triggered, with the end of colonialism marked by the opening of Brazilian ports to friendly nations and reaching its peak on September 7, 1822. Differently from Spanish-speaking neighboring countries, where independence resulted from revolutionary outbreaks, what we saw in Brazil was a continuation of the colonial period,²¹ in spite of insurgences against Portuguese resistance having taken place in most important centers of the new country.

The Armed Forces were founded at that time. An illustrative example is the birth of the Brazilian Navy, when Lord Cochrane, assisted by Taylor and Grenfell ‘assumed the command of the first Brazilian Fleet,’²² showing the strong influence²³ and support offered by Britain during that important period of Brazilian history, and perhaps representing the origin of the monarchical caveat of the Navy during the imperial period. However, in the case of the army, higher positions occupied by the Portuguese generated unpleasant feelings among Brazilian soldiers. Also, the unpopular war against Argentina, a legacy from Portugal, and the resulting problems caused by the occupation of *Banda Oriental*,²⁴ allied to the treatment dispensed to *mulato*²⁵ soldiers stand as main reasons for the army having drifted away from the emperor. This can be also seen as the cradle of the Brazilian Army *ethos*.²⁶

The monarchic period was marked by territorial disputes between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. The first conflict happened between Brazil and Argentina, regarding the present Uruguayan territory, while the second, of greater dimensions, was the war between the alliance formed by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay against Paraguay.

¹⁹ Patrick Wilken, *The Empire Adrift: The Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 2005), 17.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 63.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Antônio Albuquerque and Léo Silva, *Fatos da História Naval* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação da Marinha, 2006), 94.

²³ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 78.

²⁴ Uruguay in modern times.

²⁵ One of the Brazilian races, resulting from white (European) and black(African slaves) miscegenation.

²⁶ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 85.

An important part of the Brazilian history was the transition to the Republic, when the Army was republican and the Navy, monarchical.²⁷ The Army, now marked by a *positivist* line of thought, supported the republic as a way of bringing development to the country, while the Navy maintained the traditional side of the monarchy. Diverse sides taken by forces caused profound differences between them during the first decades of the republican era. Throughout that same period, Brazilian diplomacy flourished by the hands of the Baron of Rio Branco, ‘exhibit[ing] an *esprit de corps* that is comparable only to that of the most traditional European foreign services.’²⁸ Brazil cleared up border disputes in South America, while shifting its diplomatic alignment from Britain to the United States, a ‘firm approximation intended to make Brazil the most important country in South America.’²⁹ The period was also branded by the beginning of an open competition between Brazil and Argentina, which would characterize the South American scenario for more than 150 years.

Society in the United States was formed at the same time, but these two huge American countries showed remarkable differences regarding their societal formations, which may help to explain different paths trailed during the 20th century. *Mayflower* colonizers came to America to ‘create [God’s] kingdom on earth,’³⁰ to build a new nation. As noted by Tocqueville, ‘when the peoples of Europe landed in the New World their national characteristics were already completely formed.’³¹ Diversely, the Portuguese colonization focused on exploitation, mainly based on the *plantation* system, a practically feudal organization where among several peculiar characteristics, miscegenation was allowed as a reward for the deprivation suffered by migrants.³² The United States had a specific society building the country from the beginning whilst Brazil saw the birth of a new society during the process of colonization and creation of the nation. When the United States became independent, the concept of nation was ready and solidified, and the new country went straight from being a colony to becoming a Republic. In the Brazilian case, the nation was still being born during the more than 75-year long transition to the independent monarchical period. Moreover, it is fair to say that, when the nation achieved cohesion, Brazil shifted to the Republic – and this may be considered the nation’s true birth date.

Another important difference is that the United States already enjoyed a structured economy,³³ resulting from the work of its people, while in Brazil a self-sustained economy was only a recent experience, after investments made by the Portuguese Royal Court established in the

²⁷ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 149.

²⁸ Alberto van Klaveren, “Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies,” in *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, eds. H. Muñoz and J.S. Tulchin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 48.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 152.

³⁰ The ship that brought first English protestant colonizers to the English colony in America. Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 24.

³¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (London, Oxford University Press, 1946), 29.

³² Gilberto Freyre, *Brazil – An Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), 35-38.

³³ Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People*, 86.

colony. When the independence came, Brazil was still developing its self-sustainable economy.³⁴ The payment of 2,000,000 British pounds to Portugal as compensation for the loss of the colony appears as a relevant fact – the first Brazilian foreign loan, received from Britain.³⁵ Another interesting difference is the end of slavery. In the US, slavery ended by internal desire, due to the necessity of the country to develop as whole. In Brazil, abandonment of slavery was forced by England. The noble motive hid England's capitalist caveat, protecting its economy not only through free trade but also by forcing non-industrial countries to abandon a cheaper way of generating wealth when competing with the more costly form of English industrial production.

DEVELOPMENT OF GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL

The argumentation will analyze the geopolitical status of Brazil in South America through the eyes of Rudolf Kjellen and considering relationships according to five different biases: geopolitics, ethno-politics, economic-politics, socio-politics and regiment-politics.³⁶

The analysis will begin looking at the territory. Comprising 8.514.876 Km², Brazil is the 5th largest country in the world.³⁷ Its borders are clearly defined and there are no related disputes. The Brazilian space is broken down into five different regions. First, the Equatorial North,

³⁴ Fausto, *A Concise History*, 112.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 76.

³⁶ Ola Tunander, "Geopolitics of the North," *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 43 (2008): 168, <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/43/2/164> (accessed April 26, 2009).

³⁷ Brazil, "Countries", IBGE, <http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php> (accessed April 26, 2009).

comprising the *Legal Brazilian Amazon*³⁸ (61% of the Brazilian territory and 65% of the Amazon)³⁹ and featuring the rain forest, its biodiversity and its water (the Amazon Basin). The second is the Tropical North-East, comprising the tropical Atlantic Forest and the semi-arid. The third is the Sub-Tropical developed South-East, the most industrialized and technology-abundant region. The fourth is the Sub-Temperate central plains and highlands, where agriculture and cattle raising appear as main activities and where Brasília, the capital city is located. The last region is the temperate South, second to the South-East in development and largely influenced by 20th Century migration waves.

Besides its land territory, Brazil has another great mass under its sovereignty, its maritime space. Its continental shelf, nowadays comprising 3.5 million Km² may increase to 4.5 Km² with UN approval of the Brazilian request, and after detailed seabed studies regarding topography and resources finalization. The importance of this space is due to the fact that the 'country's trade (US\$ 195.9 million)⁴⁰ and 88 percent of its oil exploration happen in the sea.'⁴¹ The maritime space led the Navy to create the concept of the *Blue Amazon*, 'an area containing immeasurable resources and larger than the other green Amazon.'⁴²

The Brazilian population is around 194 million. It will grow to approximately 250 million by 2050, beginning a downward trend by 2062. Decreasing growth rates experienced over the recent 20 years are explained by women (6 million more than men) entering the labor market.⁴³ By 2050 the Brazilian population pyramid will be denser in the middle (individuals from 35 to 45) and thin on extremities,⁴⁴ which causes concerns about the future of the nation. The composition of the population is marked by miscegenation. Migratory waves were very clear during the slavery period (Portuguese and Africans), throughout the coffee production cycle (Italians, Spaniards and Germans) and in the middle of the 20th century, when Brazil received large numbers of European and Japanese migrants.⁴⁵ About 460,000 Indians belonging to 225 ethnic groups still exist in Brazil (0.25% of the population), all of them protected by law – the Brazilian Constitution includes provisions determining respect to indigenous cultures and regarding them as integral parts of society.⁴⁶ This fundamental characteristic, multiculturalism, is heritage of the nation's formation.

³⁸ Concept created for the economic planning of the Amazon region. "Biomass in the Amazon," *Infoener*, <http://infoener.iee.usp.br/cenbio/brasil/amlegal/amlegal.htm> (accessed April 26, 2009).

³⁹ Brazil has 65% of the Amazon and this territory is approximately 61% of Brazilian National Territory. "Amazon," *Amazon Work Group*, <http://www.gta.org.br/amazonia.php> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁴⁰ Brazil, "Countries", IBGE, <http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php> (accessed March 9, 2009).

⁴¹ Thadeu M. Coelho Lobo, "The Brazilian Nuclear Paradox" (MA Special Subject Essay, JSCSC, 2009), 3.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Brazil, "Brazilian Population Projection", IBGE, http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=207 (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁴⁴ Brazil, "Population Projections", IBGE, http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/projecao_da_populacao/2008/piramide/piramide.shtm (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁴⁵ Julio Battisti, "Brazilian Population", <http://www.julioibattisti.com.br/tutoriais/arlindojunior/geografia032.asp> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁴⁶ Brazil, "Indian Peoples," Indian National Foundation, <http://www.funai.gov.br/> (accessed April 30, 2009).

Another factor related to ethno-politics looks at the distribution of people within the Brazilian space. Population displacement is characterized by dense urbanization (84.2%). Again, using the US as a comparative tool, Brazil is not very different (80.8% being the American rate),⁴⁷ but the key aspect is the number of developed urban center in the country, significantly lower in Brazil.⁴⁸ The consequence is the urban macrocephaly of São Paulo (10 million)⁴⁹ and Rio de Janeiro (6.1 million),⁵⁰ alone concentrating practically one tenth of the country's population. Problems regarding under-housing, low levels of sanitary conditions, homeless people and urban violence are all directly linked to disproportionate concentrations in large centers, a reality which deeply contrasts with other regions, specially the Amazon, where the population density is extremely low.

Moving forward on the description of the Brazilian power, Kjellen's economy-politics principle explains how the country's wealth is distributed in space, describing its importance vis-à-vis the current situation and the position the country wishes to achieve in the International System.

Due to the location of 'more than 80 percent of its territory within the inter-tropical zone,... abundant solar power, fresh water, tillable soils and warm climate, [Brazil] produce[s] agricultural crops year-round and ... has the largest cattle population on earth.'⁵¹ Food produced results in surpluses that lead to robust commodities exports. 'It is a world leader in the production of soybeans, corn, sugar cane, animal proteins, cotton, orange juice, ... cellulose and wood products.'⁵² The 11 percent growth of the agricultural sector was responsible for more than half the Brazilian US\$ 40 billion trade surplus in 2007. In turn, this contributed to the accumulation of reserves exceeding US\$ 200 billion,⁵³ making Brazil an international creditor for the first time.⁵⁴ Technological development, adapting crops to space available is responsible for increased production in terms of yield per acre. Nevertheless, the country still enjoys 150-million acre growth reserves.⁵⁵

The country is also a world leader in the mining industry, expanding its influence through South America, Canada and Africa, the latter in partnership with Chinese and South Korean investors.⁵⁶ 'Having consolidated its position among the world largest producers of iron ore,

⁴⁷ Brazil, "Countries", IBGE, <http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁴⁸ Globalization and World Cities Research Network, "The World According to GaWC 2008," GaWC, <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2008t.html> (accessed May 25, 2009).

⁴⁹ São Paulo University, "Half of São Paulo Population live in Under-Housing", *USP On-Line*, <http://www4.usp.br/index.php/sociedade/837> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁵⁰ Fabrício Oliveira and Fernando Cavallieri, "IBGE Estimates for the Rio de Janeiro Population in 2008", Rio de Janeiro City Hall, http://www.armazemdedados.rio.rj.gov.br/arquivos/2407_estimativas%20mrj%20em%202008.PDF (accessed April 26, 2009), 3.

⁵¹ Juan Onís, "Brazil's Big Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2008): 112-113.

⁵² *ibid.*, 113.

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Fernando Freire, "Brazil is Going to Lend Money to the IMF," *Agency Brazil*, <http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2009/04/02/materia.2009-04-02.6355891221/view> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁵⁵ Onís, "Brazil's Big Moment," 112-113.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 112.

bauxite, alumina and aluminum, niobium, nickel, zinc and also copper,⁵⁷ the Brazilian mining strength should develop in coming years, as a result of technological enhancements in the sector.⁵⁸ Without considering the oil and gas sector, the Brazilian production displayed a significant increase of 11.4 percent in 2004 and was responsible for a 'US\$ 10.47 billion surplus [the same year], accounting for 31 percent of the commercial balance of the country, with US\$ 23.25 billion exports.'⁵⁹

The oil and gas sector is of extreme importance for the nation, not only because of revenues produced, but also due to the technological development it fosters, generating both direct and indirect jobs. As expected by the industry, new deposit discoveries in the continental shelf pre-salt layer raised Brazil to the sixth position among world producers, tripling its reserves to reach 40 billion barrels. Although *Petrobrás* has already begun explorations in the area,⁶⁰ potential revenue levels of these discoveries are still to be reached, considering US\$ 300 billion needed for the endeavor and the many years before state-of-the-art technology already held by the country may effectively be put into practice. Also, to become profitable, prices over US\$ 60 per barrel would need to be practiced. Although on one hand self-sufficient in oil, the country is still struggling for it, due to constant needs for more supplies demanded by the productive sector.⁶¹ Conscious of the necessity for infra-structure to support growth, the Brazilian government launched the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), that envisions the creation of the basis necessary to sustain development for the oil and gas sectors, amongst others.⁶²

It is impossible to discuss energy in Brazil without considering bio-fuels. Alternative technologies to substitute oil are not new. During petroleum shocks since 1975, Brazil developed the program known as *ProAlcool*, producing significant percentages of sugar cane alcohol-fuelled vehicles. The program boomed in the early 1980s, only to stagnate later on, due to cheap oil availability when compared to alcohol. The program underscored a characteristic of being less pollutant than regular gasoline and as of 1995 began receiving new government incentives, resulting today in a considerable percentage of alcohol present in the fuel mixture available in Brazilian gas stations.

⁵⁷ Mining in Brazil, "Brazil Great Potential", *InfoMine*, <http://www.infomine.com/publications/docs/InternationalMining/IMMay2006a.pdf> (accessed April 26, 2009), 52.

⁵⁸ Darcy Germani, "Mining in Brazil," Centre of Management and Strategic Studies, http://www.cgee.org.br/prospeccao/doc_arq/prod/registro/pdf/regdoc1023.pdf (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁵⁹ Mining in Brazil, "Brazil Great Potential", 52.

⁶⁰ Petrobrás – Biggest Brazilian oil company. O Globo, "Petrobrás Successfully Extracts Oil from Tupi," *O Globo On-Line*, <http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/mat/2009/05/01/petrobras-tira-com-sucesso-primeiro-oleo-de-tupi-755542411.asp> (accessed May 2, 2009).

⁶¹ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 113.

⁶² Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, <http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac/> (accessed March 12, 2009).

Other types of less polluting fuels are being developed, all based on renewable sources (oily seeds and palms), to provide cleaner alternatives to diesel engines.⁶³ The Government pays great attention to these programs as they foster new economic resources in times when global heating and its prognostics are central to the world's concern. Brazil finances investments in foreign refineries, via the Brazilian Social and Economic Development Bank (BNDES). Investments in Central America have a specific target, the US market, where programs use corn as the source to ethanol. Sugar cane, in spite of being criticized for being responsible for deforestation, is a lower cost source for its high production volumes and for not being a primary source of food.⁶⁴ The environmental problem is not yet a reality, as sugar cane production has not reached Legal Amazon boundaries for the moment. Moreover, the so-called Legal Amazon comprises not only the rain forest but the upland central savannas (*cerrado*), where 'the forest cover is light and the soil quality suitable for mechanized agriculture.'⁶⁵

In fact, the environment is very present, as one of the biggest concerns of Brazilian governance. Huge investments are made regarding the protection of the green cover, as is the case of the Amazon Protection System (SIPAM). One of a kind, this multi-role and multi-source system maintains constant monitoring over the Legal Amazon territory, not only regarding natural aspects (floods and climate), but also considering human activity (burn-downs and deforestation) and surveillance, thus contributing to Brazilian sovereignty over this unique environment.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the government enforced a modern set of excellent legislation, although implementation still remains a problem, with frequent accusations of corruption.⁶⁷ The reality presented depicts Brazil as the 'fourth-largest producer of greenhouse gases in the world'⁶⁸, due to forest bur and in spite of its clean energy matrix, 90 percent based on hydroelectric power and ethanol.

Natural resources are processed by a robust industrial sector, which displays textiles, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, tin, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, other machinery and equipment as main products. The sector is expected to show a 4.4 growth rate (2008), compared to the expected 5.2 percent GDP growth rate (2008), and responds for 28.5 percent of the GDP, while the service sector answers for 66 percent (2008).⁶⁹ Investments in these sectors are ensured by the PAC program, with efforts concentrated in energy and infrastructure.

⁶³ BioDiesel.com, "Pró-Alcool – Brazilian Alcohol Program," BioDieselBr.com, <http://www.biodieselbr.com/proalcool/pro-alcool.htm> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁶⁴ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 115.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Brazil, "Amazon Protection System," SIPAM, <http://www.sipam.gov.br/> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁶⁷ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 116.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ The World Factbook, "Brazil", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html> (accessed April 26, 2009).

Responsible only for 25 percent of the GDP, Brazilian trade activities are still not developed to desired levels, which results in a relatively closed economy.⁷⁰ This shows that the country relies on its resources, which in turn are key to its economic activity. Although Brazilian industry and services rely on strong technological assets, technology is an area that has yet much to develop. Brazil ranks 15 in terms of articles published in scientific periodicals, showing that investment in education is paramount for the development of the nation.⁷¹

One of the rising concerns of our times is future water scarcity in the world, the concept of *peak water*. Brazil enjoys a renewable freshwater supply of 8,233 Km³/yr.⁷² Moreover, the *Aquífero Guarani* (Guarani Aquifer) has a reserve of 46,000 Km³ of fresh water, of which 67.8 percent are located within the Brazilian Territory.⁷³

Socio-politics look at 'how is the social and cultural formation of the people.'⁷⁴ The Brazilian population Human Development Index is 0.807 (2006), 7 percent being classified as below nutrition levels.⁷⁵ 12 percent of Brazilians are illiterate and school life expectancy is 14 years, in a country investing 4 percent of the GDP in education. Of 190 million, 100.9 million form the labor force, and the forecast unemployment rate for 2008 is 8 percent.⁷⁶ United Nations (UN) Millenium Indicators reveal that Brazil is working positively on all of them, developing its society⁷⁷ through a series of wealth distribution government programs⁷⁸ and investing in education and health. Going further, although social development and investment levels (health and education) are under those of the world powers, an analysis of UN data shows that Brazil is ahead of other BRIC⁷⁹ countries, solidifying its social basis for growth.

Furthermore, 'Brazil is a truly modern society, western in its orientation and without the religious or ethnic cleavages that are tearing other nations apart.'⁸⁰ Although more than 200 idioms

⁷⁰ Miguel Diaz and Paulo R. Almeida. "Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status", The Stanley Foundation, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/powersandprinciples/BrazilCandidacyMPStatus.PDF> (accessed February 5, 2009), 6.

⁷¹ Brazil, "Scientific Production – Comparative Map", Science and Technology Ministry, <http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/9228.html> (accessed April 26, 2009).

⁷² Peter Gleick et al, "The World's Water 2008-2009," Pacific Institute, <http://www.worldwater.org/> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁷³ Underground water reserve, comprising 1.2 million Km², located on the territories of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Nadia Borghetti et al, "O Aquífero Guarani," Aquífero Guarani, <http://www.oaquiferoguarani.com.br/03.htm> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁷⁴ Everardo Backheuser, *Course of General and Brazilian Geopolitics* (Rio de Janeiro: Army Library, 1952), 34.

⁷⁵ Brazil, "Countries", IBGE, <http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁷⁶ The World Factbook, "Brazil."

⁷⁷ United Nations Statistics Division, "Millennium Development Goals Indicators," United Nations, <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁷⁸ Brazil, "Social Development," Social Development Ministry, <http://www.mds.gov.br/> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁷⁹ BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China, the possible powers of 2050. Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050", Global Economics Paper n° 99, Goldman Sachs, <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf> (accessed February 5, 2009).

⁸⁰ Miguel Diaz and Paulo R. Almeida. "Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status", 4.

exist in Brazil, Portuguese is spoken all over the country, without dialects. Exceptions are restricted to some Indian tribes desiring to preserve their own ancient language; linguistic union is a strong aspect of the nation.⁸¹

The last aspect, regiment-politics, looks at the governance of a nation. In a recent speech, former 'US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice referred to Brazil as a regional power and a global partner.'⁸² The fact is not isolated, but involves a set of internal and external developments that converged to offer the country a feasible path towards global leadership.⁸³ The smooth transition to democracy after the return of government to civilian power in 1985, sound 'orthodox economic policies sustained across two consecutive presidencies'⁸⁴ (16 years) and the way Brazil is tackling poverty and social inequality are the basis for the perennial Brazilian governance. The first, transformed Brazil in one of the strongest democracies in the region.

President Lula maintained the orthodox model of economy control initiated by his predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. One of the biases, inflation control, brought confidence to the people and allowed the government to fire a set of social projects.⁸⁵ It allowed the country to be 'the first ... to ... [meet] its Millennium [Goals] targets of reducing poverty by half.'⁸⁶ 'Brazil's success at using democracy and markets to address centuries of pernicious social inequality has global resonance.'⁸⁷

Brazil did not reach growth levels shown by other BRIC countries. In the revision of the BRIC report, Goldman Sachs highlights that 'the government had been in the process of implementing a stabilization programme, with a view to achieving macroeconomic stability.'⁸⁸ Savings, fiscal policy, increase in trading, investments in education and institutional improvement are the key aspects that should be focused.⁸⁹ On a country estimates suggest that '40 percent of GDP and almost half of the work force operate in the informal economy,'⁹⁰ a lot has to be done in terms of governance – fiscal policy – to make the formal sector attractive. Reality is that the government is changing its *modus operandi*, trying to make the public sector as competitive as the

⁸¹ Brazil. "Work Group of the Linguistic Diversity of Brazil," Culture Ministry, <http://www.cultura.gov.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/grupo-de-trabalho-da-diversidade-linguistica-do-brasil-relatorio.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2009), 3.

⁸² Diaz and Almeida. "Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status," (accessed February 5, 2009), 3.

⁸³ *ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 5-6.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World." *Foreign Affairs* 87, No 4: 2-26. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=32554472&site=ehost-live> (accessed February 6, 2009), 3.

⁸⁸ Paulo Leme. "The 'B' in BRICs," *BRICs and Beyond*. <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRICs-Chapter5.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2009), 75.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Diaz and Almeida. "Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status," (accessed February 5, 2009), 7.

private, tackling fiscal policy.⁹¹ Other issues at stake depend on reforms that are being vigorously discussed by the legislative power.⁹²

The legislative adopts the multi-party system, but, considering only situation and opposition branches, both have experienced power over recent four presidential terms, preserving a sound development policy. Fernando Henrique moved away from the idea of Constitutional change to allow more than two consecutive terms. In the beginning of his second term, Lula also rejected the possibility of a Constitutional amendment to allow his permanence in power. Although having defended Chaves during the recent referendum in Venezuela, which gave way to the possibility of his perpetuation in power, Lula keeps his position against the Constitutional amendment,⁹³ showing that the democratic mark has already been consolidated in the country.⁹⁴

The financial crisis that harasses the world will also cause implications to Brazil. The explanation is based on the trade plunge and decreased capital flows to the region.⁹⁵ Forecasts from different reliable sources, although still extremely unsubstantial, point to a slight contraction of GDP in 2009, followed by 'weaker growth in 2010.'⁹⁶ The analysis above shows that Brazilian economy relies on its natural and agricultural resources. The country 'will continue to grow as a food supplier to a hungry world.'⁹⁷

Kjellen's geopolitical definition of power, the hand with five fingers,⁹⁸ points to Brazil as a potential world power, while also depicting the country as 'work in progress,'⁹⁹ due to the urge of developing key fingers, namely governance. But something is purposely missing in the argument – military power, a key aspect of regiment-politics, acting side by side with socio-politics. Due to its complexity, it will be discussed separately.

⁹¹ Brazil. "Civil Service Need to be as Modern as Private Initiative." Planning, Budget and Management Ministry. <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/noticia.asp?p=not&cod=3729&cat=34&sec=6> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁹² Brazil. "Congressional Discussions." Brazilian Congress. <http://www2.camara.gov.br/ploneresearch?SearchableText=reforma%20pol%C3%ADtica> (accessed April 30, 2009).

⁹³ Reuters, "Brazil's Lula Defends Chaves as Referendum Nears," <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2536376520071125> (accessed May 2, 2009).

⁹⁴ Diaz and Almeida. "Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status," (accessed February 5, 2009), 8.

⁹⁵ The Economist. "Pain but no Panic," Latin America's Economies, http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13576459 (accessed May 2, 2009).

⁹⁶ The Economist. "Forecast," Country Briefings: Brazil, <http://www.economist.com/Countries/Brazil/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast> (accessed May 2, 2009).

⁹⁷ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 112.

⁹⁸ Backheuser, *Course of General and Brazilian Geopolitics*, 33.

⁹⁹ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 110.

THE ROLE OF BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES

Why do states maintain the military machine? Buzan affirms that there is no harmony between states, and security is a national concern, the state being responsible to provide it.¹⁰⁰ A more descriptive Hobbesian¹⁰¹ explanation comes from the Argentine General Aníbal Ulises Laiño:

From their origins nation-states have had to confront a vast range of conflicts, both interstate and intrastate. Conflict is inherent in human nature, and this persists everywhere on the planet, despite the ideas of idealistic theorists...

The need for armed forces results from the very existence of the State. There are armed forces because there are sovereignty, territory, life, decisions, plans, resources, etc., to preserve, and it is through its military instruments that a State exercises its monopoly on legitimate violence, to meet whatever challenge might threaten its character as a sovereign political entity.¹⁰²

The struggle for independence from Spanish domination created in the Spanish-speaking South American countries the feeling of military responsibility for their nations, the concept of 'Pátria'.¹⁰³ Limits between the armed forces and governance remained blurred for more than two centuries. Brazil, in spite of its smooth transition from colony to republic, had no different past. Since the republic, the Brazilian military were a 'shadow of power during the entire 20th century'.¹⁰⁴

Differentiated education, relating professionalization to participation in politics, led the Brazilian military, specially the Army, to concentrate not only on external threats, but also in the internal order.¹⁰⁵ Political instability empowered this position. Dominance over the military was only partially felt when strong leaders achieved and remained in power, always with the acquiescence of the barracks. The cases of Presidents Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945 and 1951-1954) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), supported by a sound political basis, are clear examples. But the military support was fundamental to governance since the advent of the Republic. Vargas's suicide, related to divergences between political and military sides of power, illustrates the argument.

¹⁰⁰ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 1, 70.

¹⁰¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2006), 93-96.

¹⁰² Aníbal Laiño in Brian Loveman. *For la Patria* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), xi.

¹⁰³ Pátria; Portuguese word for Patria – an "imagined community, a living soul, a spiritual principle... a moral consciousness [defined by] the common possession of a rich heritage of memories". Ernest Renan in Brian Loveman. *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), xvii.

¹⁰⁴ Thadeu M. Coelho Lobo, "The Social and Political Imperatives Determining Change in the Armed Forces" (Component Challenges Essay, JSCSC, 2009), 2.

¹⁰⁵ J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998), 3-5.

The central difference between Brazil and the US regarding its military is the development of the concept of nation. In Brazil the armed forces were a strong bedrock for the construction of the sense of nation, which allowed the military to have influence throughout the process. In the United States, the sense of nation already existed when militias were created during the colonial period. Gradually the State took control over the forces when it managed their expenditures and '[b]y the Revolution, civilian authority over the military meant *legislative* control.'¹⁰⁶

The period between 1930 and 1945 witnessed the strengthening of the Armed Forces, 'by rearmament, [by careerism] and by placement of military men in prestigious positions.'¹⁰⁷ The active influence of the Armed Forces would culminate in the total transference of government to the military in 1964, with support of the population and to face the communist threat.¹⁰⁸

After the Second World War, the *Containment Policy*¹⁰⁹ had an important role in South America, supporting the military in their efforts to deter the expansion of communist ideas in the region,¹¹⁰ and culminating with the Brazilian military taking the government over in March 31, 1964. The period then initiating would prove to be very important for the nation, not only because of the economic development achieved by military administrations, but moreover due to the transition back to democracy envisioned by the Military Joint of 1964 during final years. The period was marked by a continuous pursuance of security and development, supported by consistent guidelines, differing 'Brazilian regime from other military regimes under the influence of national security doctrine.'¹¹¹

The military government installed in 1964 adopted the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy created in the beginning of the 1930s. It changed the productive structure of the country, transferring a significant share of the GDP from the primary to the secondary sector of the economy. The main principle was to channel investments to the industrial sector, using the power of the state whenever the private sector lacked the amount of capital needed. Although producing high growth rates, it failed to have a robust economic policy, which resulted in products that were not competitive in the international market. Its evil trace, based on the bad education system, was the unequal income distribution, generating poverty. A main concern is still to do away with the vicious circle of poverty.¹¹²

The bureaucratic system created caused the stagnation of state-owned companies, which allied to weak fiscal policies and to an oil import-dependent economy exposed Brazil to the oil

¹⁰⁶ Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 5.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, 211.

¹⁰⁸ Loveman. *For la Patria* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), xvii.

¹⁰⁹ US Department of State, "Kennan and Containment, 1947," US Diplomatic History <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm> (accessed May 2, 2009).

¹¹⁰ Peter Kornbluh, "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup," The National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm#docs> (accessed April 2, 2009).

¹¹¹ Craig Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 155.

¹¹² Fernando Barbosa, "Economic Development: The Brazilian Experience," Getúlio Vargas Foundation, <http://www.fgv.br/professor/fholanda/Arquivo/Economicdevelop.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2009), 1-5.

shocks of the 1970s and their subsequent outcomes, culminating with the world recession. Loans taken to support the model led to a huge external debt in the 1980s. Governments adopted heterodox control plans, and the result was hyperinflation, which undermined development until the mid 1990s.¹¹³ The 1980s are known as *the lost decade*. The military regime revealed two different faces – on one hand, it created in Brazil a type of institutional structure which gave way to the emergence of one of the country's worse characteristics, corruption. On the other hand, it laid the foundation for today's development strategy.¹¹⁴

The process known as *Political Opening* and *Amnesty* was initiated in 1979 and in 1985 indirect elections took place, to elect a civilian president to replace the last *General*. The regime prepared the controlled transition to civilian control by means of negotiations between moderate members of the armed forces and of the opposition.¹¹⁵ The iron fist of the military regime, applying censorship, persecuting political opponents and limiting individual liberties resulted in the military being stigmatized as evil when the transition finally occurred. Nevertheless, the smooth transition to civilian power is a determining factor for the democratic stability later achieved. Military influence faded away with time, while political institutional solidification grew. From being a "fourth power" during the first civilian term, the military slipped to a total civilian submission model during the second Fernando Henrique term,¹¹⁶ with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, chaired by a civilian, in 1999.¹¹⁷

During the military regime, although concentrated on internal issues the armed forces were aligned to the US strategy for South America. The Military Assistance Accord of 1952, in spite of bringing new equipment and tactics to the Brazilian military, constrained its evolution as the US envisioned specific missions for South American countries in the context of the Cold War.¹¹⁸ Brazil moved away from this relationship, pursuing ways to develop indigenous military industrial capabilities and concentrating efforts on its own interests.¹¹⁹

During the 1980s the relationship between Brazil and Argentina shifted from one of antagonism to cooperation.¹²⁰ Furthermore the Cold War was no longer an issue during the 1990s. Without a real external threat, the armed forces began concentrating on the Amazon more intensely. Military perception of Amazonia is not new. The Navy Hospital Assistance Program for

¹¹³ *ibid.*, 6-16.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, 16.

¹¹⁵ Renato Lemos, "Amnesty and Political Crisis in Brazil pos-1964," Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, <http://www.ifcs.ufrj.br/~ppghis/pdf/topoi5a12.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2009), 293.

¹¹⁶ J. Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 153-154.

¹¹⁷ João R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, "The Brazilian Armed Forces after the Cold War," Latin American Studies Association, <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/MartinsFilho-Zirker.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2009), 4.

¹¹⁸ Armando Vidigal, *The Evolution of Brazilian Naval Strategic Thinking* (Rio de Janeiro: Army Library, 1985), 89.

¹¹⁹ João R. Martins Filho, "The Brazilian Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era," University of Oxford, http://www2.brazil.ox.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0005/9329/WP85-martins20filho.pdf (accessed May 2, 2009), 3-5.

¹²⁰ Joao Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, "National Identity, National Security, and Amazonia," in *Civil-Military Relations, Nation-Building, and National Identity*, eds. C. Danopoulos, D. Vajpeyi and A. Bar-or (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 109-110.

Riverine Populations dates from the middle of last century.¹²¹ The *Calha Norte Program*, was conceived in 1985, with the purposes of protecting sovereignty and fostering the development of the Amazon.¹²² Declarations made by governments (i.e., George Bush and François Mitterrand) and by non-government organizations somewhat threatened Brazilian sovereignty over the region. The military began investing more efforts in the Amazon, 'expanding military installations ... and ... combating transborder smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal mining, and guerrilla operations on the Colombian and Venezuelan borders.'¹²³ Moreover, acts focusing the development and assistance to the region were again reinforced.

Furthermore, the military also implemented efforts to preserve their training, adopting different types of exercises, covering different scenarios and war games. Development-related missions have always been very well accepted, although police-like activities, combating urban crime, have usually been received with reluctance from quarters.¹²⁴ The main reason has to do with protecting the military ethos, shielding soldiers from contact with the profitable drug business.¹²⁵

The nuclear and the Satellite Launch Vehicle programs drew attention from the international community. External pressures resulted in restructuring, to prevent an arms race in South America and in barring Brazil's efforts to supply arms to states regarded as unstable.¹²⁶ According to Martins Filho, the government of Fernando Collor, the first directly elected President, 'appeared to have used the continuing national political mistrust of the armed forces, as well as growing international pressures against them, to cancel significant prerogatives.'¹²⁷ The rapprochement began with Itamar Franco, impeached Collor's vice-president, and went on with Fernando Henrique, when the total subordination model was installed. The armed forces reached the threshold of the 21st century involved in an identity crisis.¹²⁸

¹²¹ Brazil, "Hospital Assistance Program," Brazilian Navy, <https://www.mar.mil.br/asshop/> (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹²² Brazil, "Calha Norte Program," Defense Ministry, https://www.defesa.gov.br/programa_calha_norte/index.php (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹²³ Loveman. *For la Patria*, 271.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, 271-273.

¹²⁵ Coelho Lobo, "The Social and Political Imperatives Determining Change in the Armed Forces," 7-8.

¹²⁶ Coelho Lobo, "The Brazilian Nuclear Paradox," 5.

¹²⁷ Martins Filho and Zirker, "National Identity, National Security, and Amazonia," 112.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*

ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES AFTER THE CIVILIAN SUBORDINATION MODEL

Practically 20 years later, Martins Filho's analysis¹²⁹ regarding the two Fernando Henrique terms still holds. Military salaries are still a problem and modernization is an immediate demand. Tensions still exist regarding the employment of troops in law and order enforcement (GLO) activities and Amazonia is growing in strategic importance.

Much has been discussed regarding the wage problem. In spite of creating a robust policy for the sector, the government deals with complaints from the barracks with incremental raises.¹³⁰ The modernization issue can be summarized by a lack of consistent linkage between the National Defense Policy and the armed forces. Brief bursts in modernization programs took place since the beginning of the subordination model, while those proposed by the forces were usually barred by severe budgetary constraints.¹³¹ Only the most sensitive parts of these programs received attention, and the armed forces reached the first years of the 21st century in an ageing state, in most cases unable to deliver actions necessary for national security purposes.¹³²

Frictions between the government and the military regarding deployment possibilities and police-like options to face internal crime did not lose momentum on the onset of this century. Not because of any change in perception on the part of the population, but due to the different level of influence the military have over the government. On a recent poll produced by the Army¹³³ and by *Veja*, one of the most highly regarded Brazilian weekly magazine, it became clear that the population would be happy to see the armed forces combating organized crime. But the military themselves are still reluctant in participating in operations identified as GLO.¹³⁴ The problem stems from the Brazilian strategic culture – the population respects the armed forces deeply, but fails to perceive any external threats.¹³⁵

The Amazon is still a point of major concern. The same poll stressed the concern of the population about the Amazon and its resources. With its dense rain forest, crossed by a mesh of winding rivers, the region is a very difficult environment to shape. Brazil adopted a sustainable development model,¹³⁶ in an effort to foster development which may be compatible with ecology.

¹²⁹ Martins Filho and Zirker, "The Brazilian Armed Forces after the Cold War," 5.

¹³⁰ Jornal do Brasil, "Jobim Grants Salary Adjustment till 2010," JB OnLine <http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/interna/0,,OI3703690-EI306,00-Jobim+garante+reajuste+salarial+dos+militares+ate.html> (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹³¹ Martins Filho and Zirker, "The Brazilian Armed Forces after the Cold War," 6-10.

¹³² Senator Edson Lobão, "Senate Speech – September 21, 2007," Federal Senate, <http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/atividade/pronunciamento/detTexto.asp?t=370214> (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹³³ Brazilian Army. "Public Opinion: The Population and the Military." http://www.exercito.gov.br/05notic/paineis/2007/11nov07/pesq_sensus.htm (accessed February 9, 2009).

¹³⁴ Otávio Cabral, "Em que os Militares Miram", *Veja*, http://veja.abril.com.br/281107/p_130.shtml (accessed February 9, 2009).

¹³⁵ Coelho Lobo, "The Social and Political Imperatives Determining Change in the Armed Forces," 7.

¹³⁶ WWF, "Sustainable Development in the Amazon," WWF-Brazil, http://www.wwf.org.br/natureza_brasileira/meio_ambiente_brasil/clima/mudancas_especiais/live_earth/dese_nvolvimento_sustentavel_na_amazonia/ (accessed May 2, 2009).

The presence of the armed forces is fundamental, due to their unique capacity to reach and station in extreme areas, inhibiting transnational crime¹³⁷ and border violations by neighboring guerrillas.¹³⁸ The Environment Ministry also envisions armed forces participation in combating environmental crime, protecting national parks and Indian reserves.¹³⁹

The BNDS¹⁴⁰ adopted in the end of 2008 is a milestone for the armed forces, as it reveals civilian leaders' renewed awareness about defense. It is 'based on three main pillars: reorganizing the Armed Forces, restructuring the Defense Industry and the composition policy of Armed Forces personnel.'¹⁴¹ Affirming the Constitutional principle of non-interventionism,¹⁴² it considers the path Brazil will have to trail to its desired position among the world powers. It also stresses the need of military organizational disposition to change, while granting the democratic principle of political control over the military power. One of its architects, Mangabeira Unger, Chief-Minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, affirms: '[Brazil] is not concerned by the strength of our neighbors, but ... by our own weakness. The National Defense Strategy is not a circumstantial response to circumstantial problems. It is a far-reaching inflection, a change of course and a change of direction.'¹⁴³

It is the missing link between the National Defense Policy and the armed forces. Its eyes are looking at the Amazon but also at the Continental Shelf. Furthermore, it does not consider armed forces participation in GLO operations as the norm, supporting senior military officers' ideas. It supports nuclear and satellite program continuity and establishes specific niches that must be developed by the three forces.¹⁴⁴ It establishes clear areas of military activity, fitting the forces into the national context.

Another important sector is the Defense Industry. Brazil's 'military industry was highly respected'¹⁴⁵ during the 1970s. The expressive defense industry of the 1980s, employing 50,000

¹³⁷ Cécile Marin, "Major Drug Routes in South America," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, <http://mondediplo.com/maps/drugs> (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹³⁸ Cécile Marin, "Guerrillas, Past and Present," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, <http://mondediplo.com/maps/guerilla> (accessed May 4, 2009).

¹³⁹ Agência O Globo, "Carlos Minc Wants Armed Forces in Defense of Parks and Reserves of the Amazon," *G1 Economy and Business*, http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Economia_Negocios/0..MUL476477-9356.00-CARLOS+MINC+QUER+FORCAS+ARMADAS+NA+DEFESA+DE+PARQUES+E+RESERVAS+DA+AMAZONIA.html (accessed May 5, 2009).

¹⁴⁰ Nelson Jobim and Roberto M. Unger, "National Defense Strategy: Peace and Security to Brazil" (BNDS), https://www.defesa.gov.br/eventos_temporarios/2008/estrategia_defesa_nacional.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009), i.

¹⁴¹ Coelho Lobo, "The Social and Political Imperatives Determining Change in the Armed Forces," 4.

¹⁴² Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. <http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/legislacao/const> (accessed February 5, 2009).

¹⁴³ Alex Barrionuevo, "President of Brazil Unveils Plan to Upgrade Military", *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/americas/19brazil.html?_r=2&pagewanted (accessed February 7, 2009).

¹⁴⁴ Brazil. "Brazilian National Defense Strategy," Defense Ministry, https://www.defesa.gov.br/eventos_temporarios/2008/estrat_nac_defesa/estrategia_defesa_nacional.htm (accessed May 5, 2009), 4-11.

¹⁴⁵ Alex Sánchez, "The Brazilian Military is Back," Council of Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/2008/09/the-brazilian-military-is-back-as-it-fleshes-out-its-weaponry-and-strategies/>

workers and another 10,000 in R&D, practically disappeared due to governmental mismanagement resulting from the absence of external threats.¹⁴⁶ Major industries were *Embraer*, *Engesa* and *Avibras*. Engesa focused on land-based operations, producing and exporting armored vehicles during the Cold War, while the two other companies specialized in aircraft and related products. In spite of Engesa having declared bankruptcy due to the lack of clients after the Cold War, Embraer and Avibras continue to be important Brazilian companies. The *Tucano* fighter is still a major export product, one which is gaining importance due to the rise in unconventional warfare.¹⁴⁷ With other four types of ISTAR aircraft and acting also in Commercial and Executive aviation, Embraer is today an extremely solid enterprise.¹⁴⁸ Avibras is still producing missiles and rockets.

Naval industry shares a similar story. Although contracting civilian shipyards to build naval platforms, after the Cold War the construction of war ships concentrated in the Navy Shipyard.¹⁴⁹ In an effort to spur maritime sentiment and foster development, the Navy initiated a small ship construction program, contracting medium-sized shipyards. In spite of reaching purposes desired by the Navy, these contractors are far from the needs of a modern Navy in terms of technology.

The BNDS is concerned with developing a national defense industry, fostering indigenous military acquisitions on medium to long-term. However, to promote the short-term modernization of its forces, Brazil adopts a mixed strategy which involves leading strategic projects¹⁵⁰ and looking for partnerships and acquisitions overseas.¹⁵¹

One way to analyze the military power of a country is to look at its budget throughout the years. In Brazil, the defense budget corresponds to 1.64 percent of the country's GDP. In nominal values, it displays a growth trend over the past ten years, although the story is shown to be different when one regards it as a share of the GDP. Compared to other budget areas, Defense ranks similar to Justice, Administration, Transportation and Labor, and far lower than Education, Social Assistance and Health. A significant share (75.5 percent) covers personnel (active duty), while remaining 13.2 percent are channeled to operational costs and 8.6 percent to investments.¹⁵² Although Brazil appears among the 20 nations investing more heavily in defense in relative terms, a huge gap still exists between the world powers and Brazil.¹⁵³ Correct funding is mandatory for the defense sector to succeed on assigned tasks.

(accessed May 5, 2009), 3.

¹⁴⁶ Ken Conca, "Brazil's Military –Industrial Collapse," *Review of International Studies*, no. 24 (1998): 499-507.

¹⁴⁷ Show News On Line, "Super Tucano Bares Fungs for Export," Aviation Week, <http://www.aviationweek.com/shownews/02fidae/topsto02.htm> (accessed May 5, 2009).

¹⁴⁸ Embraer, "Aircraft," <http://www.embraer.com.br/portugues/content/aeronaves/> (accessed May 5, 2009).

¹⁴⁹ Pedro Telles, "History of Naval Engineering," Transportation Ministry, <http://www.transportes.gov.br/bit/estudos/Eng-naval/historia.htm> (accessed May 5, 2009).

¹⁵⁰ The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV).

¹⁵¹ Sánchez, "The Brazilian Military is Back," 4.

¹⁵² Marco Antonio Alves, "The Federal Budget and its Reflexes in the Ministry of Defense," Secretary of Institutional Organization – Ministry of Defense. Lecture presented in the Naval War College to the Staff Course for Superior Officers (C-EMOS) in April 1, 2009.

¹⁵³ João Paulo Alsina Jr. "Ten Myths About National Defense in Brazil," *Interesse Nacional*, no. 3 (2008), http://www.interessenacional.com/artigos/arquivos/artigo_4_164415.pdf (accessed May 5, 2009), 72.

Differently from the *Le Livre Blanc*,¹⁵⁴ the BNDS did not earmark parts of the budget to proposed changes. Consequently, because of world crisis-related constraints, most of those changes and developments will simply not happen on the short-term.¹⁵⁵ Once again, this is evidence of a weak Brazilian strategic culture. Nevertheless, the BNDS is still 'a starting point for the development of the existing strategic culture towards the international environment.'¹⁵⁶

Although arguments exist to suggest decreased morale in Brazilian forces, the best way to assess the issue involves looking at the ethos within military quarters. The military stand as an important component of the state, striving to contribute for national objectives when developing missions assigned. The Brazilian armed forces have preserved their ethos after the transition to civilian control. An example to be mentioned is the stabilization mission to Haiti – MINUSTAH – where Brazil leads the military contingent and appears as the largest troop contributor.¹⁵⁷ Although further developments are certainly still necessary, the mission is already regarded as a success story. Considering the initial unstable security situation of the host country, achievements are undeniably very positive, demonstrating clear evidence of the Brazilian military ethos; even though experiencing peaks and valleys, mainly related to salary and equipment hurdles, the overall balance is extremely positive.

This author agrees with Martins Filho, when he observes that the identity crisis felt by the Brazilian armed forces when entering the 21st century is no longer a reality.¹⁵⁸ Not only do the military have an extensive set of tasks ahead of them to fulfill, but also the government has begun to pay more attention to defense. In the opinion of this author, the BNDS is a milestone for the future of the armed forces and the economic crisis is but an isolated event temporarily constraining defense investment.

To be reliable, the armed forces must be able to show effective accomplishment of their missions. It is not only a question of ethos, it is a question of equipment and training, correct funding and clear political direction. It has everything to do with political will. The BNDS is a key point to transform Brazilian armed forces into reliable tools to be used by the political level. It shows renewed awareness of the government regarding its own military power.

¹⁵⁴ France. *Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008), 291.

¹⁵⁵ Marco Antonio Alves, "The Federal Budget and its Reflexes in the Ministry of Defense."

¹⁵⁶ Coelho Lobo, "The Social and Political Imperatives Determining Change in the Armed Forces," 6.

¹⁵⁷ MINUSTAH, "Report S/2009/129 of the Secretary-General," United Nations, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/253/44/PDF/N0925344.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 5, 2009), 20.

¹⁵⁸ Martins Filho and Zirker, "The Brazilian Armed Forces after the Cold War," 1.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTEXT AND THE ROLE OF BRAZIL – THE LEVERAGE OF LEADERSHIP GOING BEYOND?

Brazilian foreign policy has two main actors: *Itamaraty*,¹⁵⁹ the Foreign Ministry playing a crucial role in formulating and implementing policy, and the President. Economic issues are a major force in shaping foreign policy, especially regarding internal development. Bureaucracy has its participation in shaping external policies, due to its professionalized and powerful influence in government. The media is the most important vehicle influencing public opinion, and it plays an important role in Brazilian politics,¹⁶⁰ bringing up important debates, as a way of scrutinizing the three powers of government, as it occurred during the Collor impeachment process.

Two key international actors have dominated Brazilian foreign policy since the Republic: the United States and Argentina. The democratization process led Brazil to approach Argentina and to redefine its relationship with the US. A western nation which has a shared set of values with the superpower, in the mid-1970s Brazil decided to declare its neutrality in the Cold War and to approach other Third World countries (especially in Latin America).¹⁶¹ Along with its new partner in South America, Brazil chose to redesign sensitive clusters, namely the nuclear and SLV programs, as a way to solidify the recognition of their stable democratic basis. The somewhat constructivist cooperation process is unique in the world¹⁶² and marked the onset of a major shift in Brazilian foreign policy, with full commitment to multilateralism, a concept that 'has been a constant characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy since the end of the nineteenth century.'¹⁶³

During the Collor administration, Brazilian foreign policy mainly focused integration with South Cone¹⁶⁴ countries, foreign trade, foreign debt, technology and the environment.¹⁶⁵ As explained by Oelsner, the creation of integration bonds with other South American countries also involved in democratization processes had the empowerment of democracy in its core.¹⁶⁶ The other central issue was development. Multilateralism appeared as a way of achieving better outcomes in negotiations with wealthy capitalist countries, when developing nations acted as a block. Consequences are seen in the GATT Uruguay round, and the subsequent creation of the WTO,¹⁶⁷ and later Brazilian victories reached in this forum. These victories in trade shook Brazil-US relations, although the two nations sharing similar values (and the US being Brazil's main trade partner) soon began efforts to overcome their differences. A new phase in this relationship is

¹⁵⁹ Itamaraty Palace – palace where the Foreign Relations Ministry was based, in Rio de Janeiro, before the transference of the Republic capital to Brasília. Became synonymous of the Ministry, due to the power of the Baron of Rio Branco. It is considered 'elitist, highly professionalized, and corporatist.' (Alberto van Klaveren, "Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies," 51.

¹⁶⁰ van Klaveren, "Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies," 46-53.

¹⁶¹ Monica Hirst, "The Foreign Policy of Brazil," in *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, eds. H. Muñoz and J.S. Tulchin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 199.

¹⁶² Coelho Lobo, "The Brazilian Nuclear Paradox," 5.

¹⁶³ Maria de Lima and Monica Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (January 2006): 25.

¹⁶⁴ Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.

¹⁶⁵ Hirst, "The Foreign Policy of Brazil," 203.

¹⁶⁶ Andrea Oelsner, "Consensus and Governance in MERCOSUL," *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 2 (2009): 197.

¹⁶⁷ GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. WTO – World Trade Organization.

expected to emerge with the newly-inaugurated US President, Barack Obama.¹⁶⁸ Brazilian victories regarding agricultural subsidies issues are adding up,¹⁶⁹ consolidating the country's position as a global trader and opening space for fairer negotiations between rich and poor countries. Multilateralism is clearly identified through resulting trade groups and is considered as the economic trend of the future. A lot is yet to come and the theme is still evolving, fundamentally because of the capitalism crisis that broke up in the second half of 2008.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, multilateralism is the basis of Brazilian foreign policy and one of the main basis of economic stability.¹⁷¹ 'The creation of the G20 [and the Brazilian "parliamentary" diplomacy were] an opportunity for Brazil to renew its role as an "indispensable intermediary" between the "weak" and the "strong".'¹⁷²

Specifically in the South American context, MERCOSUL is the major international commitment of signatory countries, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. It is based in value sharing, without being limited to economic revenues alone. In fact, the agreement aims at forming a South American union in the future, going through a free trade zone, which has not been implemented yet, and a tariffs union, which is already working.¹⁷³ Its charter is a strong persuasion tool used by signatories when pursuing shared social, economic and political values, with its original and strongest biases being democracy and development. MERCOSUL's GDP is calculated to reach approximately 2 trillion US\$, with 81.5 percent being the share of Brazil. The consumption market involved covers 250 million people, which equals the US population, with Brazil once again responding for majority, of 79.6 percent.¹⁷⁴

The entrance of Venezuela is still pending Brazilian Senate agreement. *Itamaraty* stands in support to the country's candidacy, due to last year's trade surplus with Venezuela, and considering that its controversial President Hugo Chávez has respected Brazilian interests.¹⁷⁵ But recent referendum events – abolishing presidential term limits –, the repression of political dissidents and the increasing concentration of powers in Chávez's hands are sufficient reasons for disbelief regarding the type of democracy practiced in that country.¹⁷⁶ So, the central discussion is:

¹⁶⁸ Mac Margolis, "The Crafty Superpower," *Newsweek*, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/194604> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁶⁹ Ana Maia, "Brazilian Victory in the WTO," *International Situation*, http://www.pucminas.br/imagedb/conjuntura/CNO_ARQ_NOTIC20080620100755.pdf?PHPSESSID=2231c6ba673d95a25bd3f653dab81637 (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁰ Robert Zoellick, "Modernizing Multilateralism and Markets," World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/HOMEPORTUGUESE/EXTPAISES/EXTLACINPOR/BRAZIL/NPOREXTN/0,,contentMDK:21928232~menuPK:3817198~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:3817167,00.html> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷¹ Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2009), 685.

¹⁷² Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power," 27-28.

¹⁷³ MERCOSUL, "Who We Are," <http://www.MERCOSUL.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁴ Brazil, "Countries," IBGE, <http://www.ibge.gov.br/paisesat/main.php> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁵ Mariana Jungmann, "Amorim Defends on Senate the Entrance of Venezuela in Mercosul," *Agência Brasil*, <http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2009/04/30/materia.2009-04-30.5145145701/view> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁶ The Americas, "Revolutionary Justice," *The Economist* (April 11-17, 2009), 48.

can the charter enforce democracy in Venezuela or may the neighbor's leadership undermine the integration process triggered by MERCOSUL? Regarding Brazilian position, Ferreira's argument seems more solid when based on recent facts, as when 'Brazil let aside Argentina and the Group of 20 to sustain isolated interests.'¹⁷⁷ This shows the tendency to compete with the other countries and lead them into the external scenario.¹⁷⁸ MERCOSUL is still far away from something similar to the European Union, but it must be preserved due to the integration achieved, because of its democracy-shielding trait and, last, but not least, because of economic revenues generated.

The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a complication factor for Brazil. On one hand it hauls down a series of US barriers in practice today, allowing the expansion of trade with Brazil's main trade partner. On the other hand, it challenges the Brazilian productive structure, forcing it to adapt over a short period of time, not to have to face the possibility of the undesired outcome failing to be competitive vis-à-vis the economic superpower.¹⁷⁹ Also, FTAA has to be viewed through MERCOSUL lenses. Owner of the main share of the South Cone GDP, Brazil would be responsible for preserving the economy of the block, apart from its own interests. To open the market to the pugnacious US economy would mean tremendous economic opportunities; by the same token, MERCOSUL would become open to the economical influence of the US, which might perhaps challenge the ongoing South Cone integration process.

More ambitious than MERCOSUL, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), envision the political, social and economic integration of the 12 South American countries. In spite of being an extremely recent agreement, it appears as something unique in the history of the region, and it may make the old Brazilian dream of having an access to the Pacific come true. Although not territorially, but based on a free trade area, it would render Brazilian products more competitive for Asian markets, adding more possibilities to the economic expansion. UNASUL comes with a South American Defense Council (SADC), of which the creation document was signed last year. Even more than MERCOSUL, UNASUL places Brazilian leadership in the international agenda.

According to Ferreira, the present Brazilian President, Lula, regarded the issue somewhat naively, when openly speaking about the natural Brazilian leadership. There is a big difference between hegemony and preponderance. The first indicates full acknowledgement of Brazil as a regional power and one capable of leading other countries, a leadership somehow demanded by them. On the other hand, preponderance merely means that the country would occupy a detached position, due to its levers of power when compared to others. Brazil is in a position of preponderance, although paradoxically it has been called to participate in the mediation of internal and external crises in other South American countries.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Oliveiros S. Ferreira, "Challenges to Brazilian Foreign Policy," Usina de Letras, <http://www.usinadeletras.com.br/exibelotexto.php?cod=3641&cat=Discursos> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ José de Araújo Jr., "FTAA: Risks and Opportunities for Brazil," Organization of American States, http://www.sedi.oas.org/DTTC/TRADE/PUB/STAFF_ARTICLE/tav98_risk_p.asp (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸⁰ Oliveiros S. Ferreira, "Challenges to Brazilian Foreign Policy."

In the beginning of this study the aversion of Spanish-speaking countries towards Brazilian leadership was brought up. The phenomenon is caused not only by the different language spoken, but also by diverse cultural and historical experiences. Leadership does not stem from a government decision; it comes from the core of the nation. The above-mentioned aversion is also related to the development process of Brazil, as the country expanded its economic influence outside its borders.¹⁸¹ Both the Bolivian and Paraguayan cases, challenging Brazil on the nationalization of gas plants and on the cost of Itaipu-generated energy to be sold are clear cases of not cultural, but economic aversion. Those problems are being stressed by the populist¹⁸² governments of South America, receiving economic incentives from Chávez.¹⁸³ At the same time, though, Brazil was called to mediate the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay within MERCOSUL, regarding paper plants.¹⁸⁴ At the level of a nation, the 'continental power'¹⁸⁵ was called to mediate the internal crisis in Bolivia last year, along with other South American presidents. These two examples support the argument that preponderance is what exists in the South American context, but 'resistant for the present to a *Pax Brasiliana*.'¹⁸⁶

The fact of not being in a position of leadership leaves Brazil in a comfortable condition, being able to deal realistically with surrounding countries. Moreover, reality is actually quite different. On the Bolivian gas plants, Brazil accepted nationalization as a way to help neighbors to develop.¹⁸⁷ Brazilian ideas are based on the premise that it is necessary to foster South American growth, Brazil's immediate trade market, to have stability deeply rooted in the region, as a way to make MERCOSUL a more competitive block. Brazilian tendency to lead has already been exposed and '*Itamaraty* became much more explicit about its desire and its determination to move rapidly towards South American leadership.'¹⁸⁸

This tendency to lead, along with the creation of the SADC brings up the discussion about military power in South America. 'Improved military cooperation has been a visible outgrowth of the political rapprochement and economic convergence achieved among the member countries of MERCOSU[L].'¹⁸⁹ Despite strong regional democratic characteristics, divergences still exist, due to

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*

¹⁸² Joen Kellberg, "Pragmatism and Populism in South America," University of North Carolina, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/1012/kell/kellberg_hemis.html (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸³ Juan Forero and Peter Goodman, "Chávez Builds His Sphere of Influence," The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/22/AR2007022201875_pf.html (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸⁴ Celso Lafer, "Argentina, Uruguay and the Paper Plants," O Estado de São Paulo, <http://www.eagora.org.br/arquivo/Argentina-Uruguai-e-as-papeleras/> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸⁵ USA Today, "Regional Summit Seeks Solution to Bolivia Crisis," http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-09-15-2561520486_x.htm (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸⁶ D. Myers, "Brazil: The Quest for South American Leadership," in *Regional Hegemons*, ed. D. Myers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 248.

¹⁸⁷ Adriana Chiarini, "Lula Orders Petrobras to Invest on PAC," O Estado de São Paulo, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,lula-diz-que-nao-tem-chororo-e-manda-petrobras-gastar-no-pac,334669,0.htm> (accessed May 10, 2009).

¹⁸⁸ Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power," 30.

¹⁸⁹ David Pion-Berlin, "Will Soldiers Follow?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs* (Spring 2000): 62.

remaining relative insecurities.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, differences between South American sub-complexes, the South Cone and the North Andean region, create difficulties in envisioning a single South American security complex.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, the SADC is a new way to face defense in South America. Although still too recent, it will bring new responsibilities to South American nations.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat is also an important concern for Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil advocates the reform of the organization through creating new seats, one of which is expected to be granted to the country. Expectations are founded on the level achieved by the nation in the international scenario, as a result of the societal and economic development experienced in recent decades. Brazil presents the world with a different way of emerging as a power, one which has nothing to do with nuclear weapons or strong military force.¹⁹² A smart power, the combination of soft and hard power, is widely used in Haiti. The present government opened 35 new embassies, most of them in Africa and in the Caribbean.¹⁹³ The IBSA Forum (India, Brazil and South Africa), a strategic partnership among developing countries, as a way of commitment to democratic institutions and values, struggle against poverty and...conviction [of multilateralism strengthen,¹⁹⁴ places Brazilian leadership beyond South American borders.

But the *modus operandi* involved in this foreign policy is intimately related to the present Lula administration. Perennial objectives are still valid: to develop and achieve international recognition, to receive a seat in the Security Council, to haul down barriers, allowing more countries to benefit from protectionism-free trade and to reduce inequality in South America. Furthermore, the government adopted the BNDS, not to consider specific threats, but wealth that must be protected. The world showed positive reaction. In fact, Brazilian leadership is better perceived by rich countries than by South American nations,¹⁹⁵ and here is where the implementation problem lies.

A key issue that must not be forgotten is the Brazilian non-interventionism trace and the 'unprecedented demands on Brazil,...requir[ing] capabilities that go beyond *Itamaraty's* unquestioned diplomatic skills. [The] regional power...intervened in political crisis in Venezuela, Bolivia, Equador and Haiti.¹⁹⁶ Public opinion is divided – between conservatives who support a constitutional orientation, and progressive groups, who welcome a new interventionist face. This question would generate some challenges: to maintain the G20 united, to sustain domestic support and a profound debate about changes in foreign policy and in the Constitution.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁰ *ibid.*, 63.

¹⁹¹ Antônio Guerreiro, "Military Regional Integration in South America" (Naval War College, 2006), 47.

¹⁹² Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power," 22.

¹⁹³ Margolis, "The Crafty Superpower."

¹⁹⁴ Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power," 36.

¹⁹⁵ Opinion, "El Liderazgo de Brasil," *La Nación*, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1125178 (accessed May 12, 2009).

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 32.

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 37.

THE ROLE OF BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES FACING 21st CENTURY THREATS

Moving a step forward, it is imperative to establish the distinction between Security and Defense. According to Buzan, 'security of human collectives is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.'¹⁹⁸ Security is the sense of not

¹⁹⁸ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 19.

being threatened in all of those aspects; it 'is about survival, [and] ... key to legitimizing the use of force.'¹⁹⁹ Security identifies a threat in a specific actor. Considered in addition to a related vulnerability, this threat will define risk. Security would consider the use of military power in unconventional manners, though. Defense is the act of maintaining security facing external threats to state sovereignty. 'It is related, at last instance, to war.'²⁰⁰ The military sector will usually act on behalf of a specific actor: the state.²⁰¹ Defense will thus consider the employment of armed forces in the traditional way.

A first step in the analysis of Brazilian forces in this century has to do with defining threats and where they come from. A risk analysis is needed, to establish the securitization of the South American security complex, the immediate area of actuation of Brazil.²⁰² This study will consider two main sources to assess the threat, using one as complement to the other. First, an assessment of threat to South America made outside of Brazil; second, work conducted within the country, with participation of Brazilian Embassies worldwide, contributing with perceptions of other actors in the international system. The analysis will compare threats to vulnerabilities and will first look at if the risk involves security or defense; and second, if there is a role for the military to play in countering this risk; finally, it will look at how the military can mitigate this risk. Furthermore, the armed forces will not only have the status of a main actor, but will also be considered as contributors to mitigate the risk.

The first aspect considered is the resource-based Brazilian economy, affecting the economic and military sectors of security. The issue has two related difficulties: the Amazon and its natural friction regarding penetration, generating control complexities; and the *Blue Amazon*, with its huge maritime dimensions, and the related complications of control. Although there are no envisioned threats posed to resources, one of the referenced works identifies the Brazilian vulnerability as unsuitable military capability facing the crisis possibility.²⁰³ Those aspects are directly linked to capability and training, which cannot be achieved in case of immediate need. Acting as the main state asset, the armed forces must be fully capable of participating with force in short term notice to operate in the defense of these areas. The internal study mentioned considers the present level of low short-term risk, but it also envisions the possibility of increased risk over time, due to oil and gas shortages,²⁰⁴ emphasized by recent Brazilian maritime discoveries.

International border security and transnational crime are the second aspect of military, political, economic and environmental sectors of security. The Amazon appears in this issue mix as a complication factor, one which brings up military participation. 'Brazil's remote northern and

¹⁹⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

²⁰⁰ Oscar Medeiros Filho, "Geopolitical Scenarios and Employment of Armed Forces in South America," São Paulo University, <http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-01042005-210436/> (accessed May 11, 2009), 80.

²⁰¹ *ibid.*, 22.

²⁰² *ibid.*, 11-24.

²⁰³ Flores et al, "The Insertion of Brazil," 8.

²⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 6.

western frontiers represent several challenges to national security.²⁰⁵ The possibility of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) crossing the international border, using Brazilian territory as source for raw material procurement, is a concern of the armed forces, who act in support to the Federal Police (FP), the main constitutional asset for border control. The FARC represents an addition to the list of drug trafficking actors which underscores the need of military presence, although its insurgent characteristics are apparently fading away. Environmental crimes are frequent in the Amazon, sometimes related to border violations and to natural resources trafficking. The rugged terrain requires military assets to oppose this threat, including human, material, surveillance and intelligence capabilities. Although military vulnerability is considered low, the limited availability of FP assets and the natural Amazon terrain result in major force projection difficulties, thereby increasing the level of risk.²⁰⁶ The BNDS identified this aspect as a fundamental concern and established the control of the Amazon as paramount. The armed forces will have to increase their presence in this empty space, contributing to its security, control and development.

The illegal flow of funds, the Islamic macro problem, terrorism and insurgency may be grouped to form the third aspect of security, which refers to the political and societal sectors. The United States considers South America as an area prone to provide facilities to host terrorists, including training camps and funding. The porosity of the Brazilian borders demand attention and, due to the absence of government presence on the Paraguayan side, the Tri-Border Area (TBA)²⁰⁷ is considered as one of the sources of funding for some important Islamic terrorist organizations. No hard evidence has yet been found,²⁰⁸ only 'high levels of contraband and drugs smuggling.'²⁰⁹ In the region, cooperation with the US in antiterrorism efforts has increased, the exception being Venezuela, a country believed to have funding ties with the FARC.²¹⁰ The main threat for Brazil is the relationship established between the FARC and some Brazilian drug traffickers.²¹¹ This is a security threat and the vulnerability here has to do with inefficient government posture. The armed forces are ready to operate to support government agencies, basically with intelligence and contributing to mitigate risk.

²⁰⁵ Issue Twenty-four – 2009," Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments (Coulson: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2009), 131.

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 131-132.

²⁰⁷ Triple border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.

²⁰⁸ Philip Abbot, "The Terrorist Threat in the Triple Border Area: Myth or Reality?" *Military Review*, [http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/scripts/cqcg.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SAVE\[CGI\]=/scripts/cqcg.exe/@ss_prod.env&CQ_MAIN=YES&CQ_LOGIN=YES&CQDC=Thu%20May%2014%2015%3A55%3A54%20UTC+0100%202009&CQ_SAVE\[GIFs\]=/rware/gif8&CQ_USER_NAME=87218075&CQ_PASSWORD=xxx&CQ_SAVE\[CPU\]=Intel&CQ_SAVE\[Browser\]=W3C&CQ_SAVE\[BrowserVersion\]=ie5_5up&CQ_SAVE\[Base\]=calldp.leavenworth.army.mil&CQ_SAVE\[Home\]=http%3A/callp.leavenworth.army.mil/call_pub.html](http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/scripts/cqcg.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SAVE[CGI]=/scripts/cqcg.exe/@ss_prod.env&CQ_MAIN=YES&CQ_LOGIN=YES&CQDC=Thu%20May%2014%2015%3A55%3A54%20UTC+0100%202009&CQ_SAVE[GIFs]=/rware/gif8&CQ_USER_NAME=87218075&CQ_PASSWORD=xxx&CQ_SAVE[CPU]=Intel&CQ_SAVE[Browser]=W3C&CQ_SAVE[BrowserVersion]=ie5_5up&CQ_SAVE[Base]=calldp.leavenworth.army.mil&CQ_SAVE[Home]=http%3A/callp.leavenworth.army.mil/call_pub.html) (accessed May 14, 2009), 19.

²⁰⁹ Jane's, "South America," 132.

²¹⁰ Mark Sullivan, "Latin America: Terrorist Issues," CRS Report for Congress, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS21049.pdf> (accessed May 14, 2009), 6.

²¹¹ Jane's, "South America," 132.

Chávez brings up the fourth security-related issue, the number of democratically unstable and populist regimes displaying authoritarian tendencies and fostering economic disputes in South America. His populist regime is using Venezuelan oil revenues to influence other social movements in the region with a single objective – to try to create an image of leadership around Hugo Chávez. One of the consequences was the challenge of Brazilian interests by minor countries, like Ecuador, Paraguay and Bolivia, imposing in some cases financial losses for Brazil. With ‘oil prices slumping, violent crime at warzone levels in Caracas, and the opposition beginning to re-assert itself,’²¹² 2009 will be a challenging year, bringing economic difficulties to a systemically weak economy.²¹³ Instability may result, in a government arguably non-democratic already. A role for the US in such a crisis is very likely,²¹⁴ as a major Venezuelan oil importer.²¹⁵ Brazil’s preponderant position and the Organization of American States (OAS) may include the country as another player, acting in the field of security. The Brazilian multilateralism would be very welcome because of the new Russian interests in Venezuela. After all, the country is not vulnerable to this threat: comparing military and economic powers, no risk is represented.²¹⁶

An important comment is indeed necessary regarding collective security organizations established in the American continent. Although reported as useless according to Brazilian Embassies’ perceptions,²¹⁷ the OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) are still operational, and their powers may be used, depending only on the wish of signatory members; this hypothesis should not be forgotten.

Recent Russian strategic bombers landing in Venezuela²¹⁸ as a part of an extensive agreement²¹⁹ bring questions about the will to respect the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone, which stands as a fifth military sector security concern. Despite Venezuelan proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) being regarded as extremely unlikely, the possibility must not be disregarded.²²⁰ It would pose significant threat to Brazil where the country is totally vulnerable. The mitigation of risk may result in dramatic outcomes, as a consequence of the possible change in the Brazilian strategic culture. The demand for security may lead to a rupture in the non-nuclear paradigm, in a country where capacity already exists to produce an indigenous nuclear weapon.²²¹ Possible consequences are innumerable, and the military would be the main actors acting in security or in defense, as an option of last resort.

²¹² *ibid.*, ix.

²¹³ *ibid.*, 630.

²¹⁴ Flores et al, “The Insertion of Brazil,” 8.

²¹⁵ US, “Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports – Top 15 Countries,” Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html (accessed May 14, 2009).

²¹⁶ Jane’s, “South America,” xiii.

²¹⁷ Flores et al, “The Insertion of Brazil,” 14.

²¹⁸ Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, “T-160 Bombers in Venezuela,” http://russianforces.org/blog/2008/09/tu-160_bombers_in_venezuela.shtml (accessed May 14, 2009).

²¹⁹ BBC, “Russia-Venezuela Nuclear Agreement,” BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7751562.stm> (accessed May 14, 2009).

²²⁰ Flores et al, “The Insertion of Brazil,” 13.

²²¹ Coelho Lobo, “Brazilian Nuclear Paradox,” 6-13.

Brazil is expected to have an active role in resolving contentious issues in South America. There are many diverging issues, especially between Venezuela and Colombia, Venezuela and Guiana (Essequibo Region), Chile and Peru, Uruguay and Argentina, and Argentina and the United Kingdom (continental shelf surrounding the Falkland/Malvinas Islands).²²² Bolivian gas and the Itaipu dam are current Brazilian economic vulnerabilities. These issues represent a sixth threat to the political, economic and military sectors of security. Regarding Brazil, outcomes are perceived by the political and economic sectors, although no participation of the armed forces is considered. Presently, the employment of economic pressure and diplomacy to resolve disputes involving Brazil is a government policy, not a state policy. The military must be ready to act on behalf of the state's interests, contributing to guarantee security.

There is no envisioned vulnerability considering the regional level, but with the expectation of possible Brazilian future leadership in South America, the military must be also ready to act under United Nations mandate, the seventh threat, located in political and societal (public opinion) sectors of security. Considering the position desired by Brazil among the world powers, and using the example of Haiti, the country must have military capability also to deploy outside South America. The armed forces have deployment vulnerabilities, resulting from their current capabilities. The procurement effort devised in the BNDS should reduce this risk to security.²²³

Concentrating inside the country, social inequality and consequent violent crime are considered the eighth aspect regarding security, positioned in the societal and political sectors. This is perhaps the main friction between the military and political levels, as explained above. Nevertheless, the military must be ready to engage in GLO operations, cooperating with civilian powers and observing the constitutional principle of episodic intervention.²²⁴ Although not fully prepared to act unconventionally, the armed forces are implementing adjustments to their doctrine, already offering risk mitigation. There is another area where the armed forces are already active, contributing to reduce social inequality: recruitment. The compulsory recruitment will continue, following the BNDS directions.

Finally, the ninth and last threat to security considered by this study is the economic vulnerability of Brazil.²²⁵ It is economic in essence, but consequences reach societal and political security sectors. According to the BNDS, the armed forces will participate in the process of solidifying the Brazilian economic basis, due to incentives to be injected in the defense industry. The armed forces will contribute to reduce security risk.

The analysis described in this chapter shows that the present and short to medium-term reality shows security overtaking defense, which determines the redefinition of the armed forces.²²⁶

²²² Opinion, "Our Continental Shelf," La Nacion, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1127402&high=malvinas (accessed May 14, 2009).

²²³ Flores et al, "The Insertion of Brazil," 23.

²²⁴ Brazil, *1998 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, Presidency of Republic, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constitui%C3%A7ao.htm (accessed May 14, 2009), article 142.

²²⁵ Jane's, "South America," 132.

²²⁶ Medeiros Filho, "Geopolitical Scenarios," 97.

New displacements through the territory, new capabilities and considerable investments are expected. Medium-term external independence regarding procurement is also to happen. The military are not only security and defense-driven; they have a strong development contribution mission.

To face modern time threats, the military must fundamentally be flexible. The government is at a turning point to promote Brazilian adjustment, as the non-interventionist practice goes against the way world power armed forces operate today. The desired regional leadership, which is arguably being achieved, added to the ascension to a status of important world player would imply in obligations to promote stability overseas, along with the other powers – as is happening in Haiti. The risk is not external, but internal. The perception regarding operations being conducted under UN mandate around the world is that the Brazilian Constitution would be severely violated without new adjustments.

CONCLUSION

The building of the Brazilian nation began in the colonial period, went on through the imperial era and reached the republic, when the sense of nation may really be said to have been present. The military participated intensely in this process and because of their leadership and educational qualities boundaries between the political and military levels became blurred. The military were a shadow of power for almost a century.

The military government period began in 1964, bringing along both good and evil consequences, but its major legacy was the process of military subordination to civilian rule. The success of the process is revealed by the solid democratic basis of the country, with alternating political wings in power, while national objectives are maintained. From the point of view of the armed forces, decreased prestige and the political perception of them being an obstacle for democratic solidification resulted in the military crossing the threshold towards the 21st century involved in an identity crisis.

After practically ten years of the new millennium, the military still face problems related to political guidance and funding, while they struggle to preserve their ethos and to avoid deployment in sensitive internal security missions. Moreover the armed forces are already correctly positioned regarding the nation and its desires, reverting last century's identity crisis picture. The armed forces, ruling the nation till late 1980s, crossed the line of conditional civilian subordination, transforming into responsible contributors to national power. The lack of strategic culture is also beginning to revert. The BNDS, in spite of still being somewhat immature, is a first step and an attempt to link national power to military power. It offers ample political guidance linkage, including the armed forces in the development process of Brazil, although it unfortunately fails to establish funding ties.

Although some Brazilian leaders may act as if the country were in a position of regional leadership, the fact is that Brazil occupies a position of mere preponderance in the South American context. Brazilian foreign policy, with its strong multilateralism and parliamentary vein is transforming the nation into an intermediate between rich and poor countries, leveraging its influence beyond South American borders. Meanwhile the somewhat difficult scenario installed in the region due to huge developmental gaps between the countries and mainly because of the populist approach of local leaders, puts Brazil into an uneasy position. The possibility of the country detaching itself from South America to begin following its own single path towards an upper level of world discussion is very difficult, when the surrounding environment still shelters different and important concerns. Integration processes have still not shown clear indications of growth and local disputes exist. Brazil also witnesses a new paradigm emerging: how to be an influential power and leader without intervening in other country's problems. The debate is already ongoing.

The country is still developing its geopolitical branches. Despite of being extremely dependant of resources, its reserves are both huge and varied. Because of the size of the country, it displays a tremendously diverse geography, one which shapes human domination and poses permanent threats to governance. The military component of the national power has and will always have a fundamental role to play – defense. Brazil will have to maintain its armed forces because the military must be prepared to defend national interests, as capability just cannot be created overnight. In the Brazilian case, the core issue is represented by resources of which the economy depends, which has everything to do with development. The specific case of disposition of resources in Brazilian natural frictional space increases the importance of the military power,

giving sustainability to development by exerting defence. South American scenario shows fundamental differences, making very unlikely the adoption of a common security system. Furthermore risk is not only assessed by a threat, but rather by an existent vulnerability regarding the force generation necessary to face a possible pace of threat generation. Whilst there are no sensible threats to resources in short to medium terms, the armed forces have other security roles, which in turn contribute to the development of a national power.

This work shows that Brazil is a young nation and that the country is finally trailing the right path to development. The armed forces showed the nation its adaptation characteristic by positioning themselves as responsible contributors, yet having the sense of responsibility to the *patria*. Finally, this time the giant is really awake and wishes to be a responsible world power, but it is very likely to have to adjust itself to show the world a different approach to world matters.

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