A Aukus e a nova estratégia da contenção : implicações na Marinha Real Australiana e reflexões para a Marinha do Brasil

Abstract

The present thesis investigates the trilateral security partnership AUKUS between Australia, United Kingdom and United States, in the context of the New Containment Strategy in the Indo-Pacific from the second decade of the 21st century. The research aims to understand the New Containment Strategy in the face of Chinese assertiveness, analyze AUKUS with particular interest in the strategy of employing nuclear-powered attack submarines, and, based on contemporary naval strategy theorists like Ian Speller and Milan Vego, identify reflections and lessons applicable to the Brazilian Navy regarding the strategy for employing national nuclear-powered attack submarine within a maritime strategy for the South Atlantic. It concludes that while the United States and the United Kingdom view AUKUS as an instrument to contain Chinese power, Australia uses the partnership to implement the "Strategy of Denial" (SOD), ensuring access to advanced technologies, especially in submarine capabilities. The nuclear-powered attack submarines will play a crucial role, attacking adversaries beyond the reach of air forces and land-based missiles, contributing to a layered defense. Similarly, the Brazilian Navy can adopt a maritime strategy in the South Atlantic based on concentric arcs and a “Force of Attrition” composed of conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines